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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND
BENEFICENCE IN MEDICAL ETHICS:
PROPOSAL FOR A RESOLUTION*
Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D. **
and David C. Thomasma, Ph.D. *
I INTRODUCTION
Three radical changes have occurred in the ancient edifice of medical eth-
ics in the last two decades. Each promises to transform the nature of the
physician-patient relationship with repercussions in the domains of law, soci-
ety, and ethics. Each merits the most careful scrutiny by the profession and
the public, because how we resolve the moral dilemmas they produce will
determine not only our relationships with the medical profession, but what
kind of society we are, or wish to be.
The three changes we consider most crucial are these: 1) the shift in the
locus of decision-making from the physician to the patient - a shift philo-
sophically from the primacy of beneficence to the primacy of autonomy in
physician-patient relationships; 2) an unprecedented expansion of medical
technological capability, thus expanding enormously the range and complex-
ity of clinical and policy decisions in health care; 3) the entry of economic
considerations as primary forces in individual and policy decisions regarding
health and medical care, thereby creating a conflict between the canons of
economics and the canons of traditional medical ethics.
In this essay we will confine ourselves only to the first of this triad of
changes - the shift from beneficence to autonomy in medical ethics. We
recognize the interdependence of the whole triad of changes, and that to
dissect them from each other is difficult and somewhat misleading. Yet the
scope of this essay forbids a full examination of the interdependence of au-
tonomy, technological possibility, and economics in the evolution of contem-
porary medical ethics. We are preparing a more thorough examination of
* This essay derives in part from a Thomas J. White Lecture delivered by Dr. Pellegrino
at The Notre Dame University Law School, April 11, 1985.
** Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics and John Carrol Professor of Medicine and
Medical Humanities, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
*** Director, Department of Medical Humanities, Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola
University, and Father Michael I. English, S.J., Professor of Medical Ethics.
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these relationships in a forthcoming book. (E.D. Pellegrino and D.C. Thom-
asma, For the Patient's Good (unpublished manuscript)).
This essay falls into two parts: first, we will examine the limitations of
both the autonomy and paternalist models of the physician-patient relation-
ship and second, we will outline a model of beneficence that promotes the
good of the patient yet de-absolutizes autonomy and avoids the pitfalls of
traditional paternalism.
II THE AUTONOMY MODEL AND ITS LIMITATIONS
A. Socio-historical Critique of Autonomy
The autonomy "model" of clinical decision-making is firmly grounded in
the dignity of human persons and the claim they have on each other to pri-
vacy, self-direction, the establishment of their own values and life-plans
based on information and reasoning, and the freedom to act on the results of
their cogitations. The historical origin of the principle of autonomy, as it is
interpreted by many ethicists today, is of recent date. It is found mainly in
the philosophical treatises of the French and English Enlightenments and
the emergence of the doctrines of individual and political rights to freedom
that undergird modern democracy.
The notions of individual rights and autonomy have been gathering
strength in American public life since the founding of our country. They,
however, lagged behind in the medical relationship. Only in the last several
decades have they become powerful enough to challenge the traditional pa-
ternalism that dominated the relations of doctors and patients for 2,500
years - at least since the time of Hippocrates.' For our purposes, we need
not trace this history in detail. It suffices to take note of the major forces
that have nurtured the exponential growth of autonomy in the last two
decades.
First, is the expansion of political democracy to every sphere of civic life
fostering in each of us the desire to participate in the decisions that affect our
lives as individuals? This "democratization" carries with it a certain distrust
of all authority, expertise, privilege and prerogative - of the kind tradition-
ally wielded by physicians, lawyers and other professionals.
To this we must add the general improvement in the education of the
public and the dissemination by the media of information about both the
advances of medicine as well as the ethical and legal dilemmas those ad-
vances produce. As a result, the public appreciates that it makes a vast dif-
1. Newton, The Patient as Responsible Adult: Consequences of the Revised Perspective, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHIL-
OSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 240-49 (1982).
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ference in our lives what decisions doctors make in the use of medical
knowledge, and that those decisions increasingly involve value choices.
Lastly, the increasingly divergent moral pluralism in our society impels us
to seek to protect our personal values against usurpation by others. This is
recognized as a genuine danger in medical decisions which can involve our
deepest convictions about life and death, abortion, euthanasia, genetic ma-
nipulation, and the like.
These factors have converged to undermine the traditional model of the
benign, paternalistic physician, who assumes full responsibility and author-
ity to determine the patient's best interests and to act so as to advance those
interests - if need be, without the patient's participation.2 This is the con-
ception of "beneficence" still dominant in the minds of many physicians and
patients; it still shapes the ethos and ethics of medicine. It is the conception,
too, that is the focus of criticism by the proponents of autonomy who equate
beneficence almost entirely with medical paternalism.
It is true that, here and there, in the history of medicine there were sugges-
tions of patient participation in clinical decisions. Plato, for example, distin-
guished the physician of the free man from the physician of the slave by the
fact that the former educated and consulted with his patient, while the latter
did not. It is true too, as.Katz points out, that in more recent times, some
like Samuel de Sorbire tentatively suggested that patients ought to be part of
the doctor's decisions.3 Moreover, a closer reading of Percival's Ethics
serves to qualify the standard account of the Eighteenth Century physician
as merely a condescending gentleman - authoritarian.4 The same is true of
some aspects of Worthington Hooker's Treatise on Physicians and Patients5
- an American work on medical morals that deserves to be better known.
But exceptions like these aside, paternalism was the dominant, and indeed
the accepted, model of the clinical relationship for most of medicine's his-
tory. Paternalism was not as ethically dubious in times past as it would be
today. For one thing, the educational gap between physician and patient
was wider than it is now. Further, participatory democracy even in Greek
times was not a reality for most people. Finally, almost all medical treat-
2. Neither in the oath, the other deontological books, nor the whole body of the Hippo-
cratic corpus is there evidence of an obligation to obtain patient consent or participation. In-
deed, most of the direct references were to the contrary. See Pellegrino, Toward A
Reconstruction of Medical Morality: The Primacy of the Act of Profession and the Fact of Ill-
ness, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 32 (1979).
3. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
4. Pellegrino, Foreword to T. PERCIVAL, The Ethics Beneath The Etiquette, in MEDICAL
ETHICS, ON A CODE OF INSTITUTIONS AND PRECEPTS ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON (1985).
5. W. HOOKER, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1849).
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ments were non-specific, as much depended upon faith in the physician as on
any genuine therapeutic potency. Indeed, most therapeutic efforts were
either useless or dangerous. Ordinary patients were not aware, however, of
the therapeutic poverty of most prescriptions.
"Aesculapian Power" was a major ingredient of cure. It rested on faith in
the quasi-hieratic power and authority of the physician as a person. Indeed,
the physician himself was part and parcel of the cure as Lain Entralgo points
out.' Only in very recent times have these conditions changed so radically
that the more objectionable features of medical paternalism have begun to be
felt. Medicine's capacities to alter individual and social life are unprece-
dented. An educated public grasps this fact and no image grants the physi-
cian unrestricted discretion in the use of his powers.
Eliot Freidson has detailed the negative effects of the professionalization
of contemporary medicine.7 His study is very cogent but it undervalues
some of the more positive aspects of professionalization. Anything so pow-
erful as modern medicine requires a formal professionalization process to
assure that high levels of competence, conduct and accountability are main-
tained. This aspect of professionalization must not be lost in the current
antipathy to paternalism.
In fact, the dangers of paternalism lie less in professionalization than in
the irresponsible uses of power and the attributions of superiority that arise
from the social ascendancy of medicine. As John Stuart Mill remarked,
"Whenever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality ema-
nates from its class interests and its feelings of superiority." 8 This too is the
basis for Illich's mordant criticism but he weakens his case by the polemics
of social revolution with which he heavily flavors his charges against med-
icine.9
Thus, the revulsion many competent adults feel about medical paternalism
may more properly derive from anger about physicians' pretensions as a su-
perior class than from any inherent property of professionalism itself. Wo-
men have often complained that gynecologists "pooh-pooh" their com-
plaints (e.g., the premenstrual syndrome debate) on the grounds of sexist
power struggles. Patients are forced to wait for the doctor in the waiting
rooms, suggesting that their time, their values, their lives are not as impor-
tant as the doctor's. Cartoons abound in which the public fears that doctors
6. P. LAIN ENTRALGO, LA MEDICINA IPPOCRATICA (1978); P. LAIN ENTRALGO, Doc-
TOR AND PATIENT (1969).
7. E. FREIDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CON-
TROL (1975).
8. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (1978).
9. I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1977).
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are too busy managing their money to care about patients. These are exam-
ples more of the role of power and class than of any inherent properties of
professionalization. They are often at the bottom of the declining status of
the physician recorded in serial American Medical Association ("AMA")
surveys on the public image of the doctor.10
The patient autonomy movement is an understandable counter-reaction to
such class domination. Nonetheless, autonomy should not be viewed as an
absolute model for the doctor-patient relationship itself because it is insuffi-
cient to claim, as the move to patient autonomy often does, that medical
paternalism is a direct outgrowth of professionalization. Nor is paternalism
a primafacie medical or social evil as Berlant supposes.'1 Modern medicine
incorporates moments of patient choice as well as moments of necessary,
beneficial paternalism. The former occur when the diagnosis and options are
clear and well documented. The latter occur when not enough is known
about a disease and its prognosis, when no therapeutic modality has a clear
edge, or when an existing therapy has marginal or dubious benefit. In these
cases, physicians may be forced to recommend, even urge a course of action
based on an intuitive assessment of the data. The important thing here is
that the physician make clear the uncertainties with which he must contend.
This preserves autonomy and so it is not paternalistic but it is beneficent.
Some philosophers who defend the absoluteness of patient autonomy on
moral grounds neglect the fact that "decision-making" among humans is an
inter-personal transaction. They thus downgrade the bilaterality of the pa-
tient-physician relationship. Doctor and patient are existentially bound to
each other in a way that makes moral atomism and absolute decisional au-
tonomy unrealistic and undesirable goals for both parties. Moreover, the
philosophical atomism on which such a notion is based is of dubious viability
in a complex, interrelated, technologically-driven society like our own.' 2
The patient autonomy model does not give sufficient attention to the im-
pact of disease on the patient's capacities for autonomy. We agree with Eric
Cassell that medicine should restore patient autonomy, 13 but one cannot as-
sume that autonomy is fully restorable or preservable in cases of serious ill-
ness. Patricia Bradley formulates a telling objection to the position of
Robert Veatch, one of the most prominent ethicists arguing for the patient
autonomy model. According to Bradley,
10. L.S. FRESHNECK, PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES
(1984).
11. J.L. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY (1985).
12. Thomasma, The Goals of Medicine and Society, in STUDIES IN SCIENCE AND CUL-
TURE (H. Brock ed. 1985).
13. E.J. CASSELL, THE HEALER'S ART (1985).
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Veatch argues that the relationship between doctor and patient is
an equal one, ignoring ... the fact of illness which places the pa-
tient in a potentially vulnerable relationship with his physician.
Based as it is on a wrong assumption, this model must be rejected
when applied to the traditional doctor-patient relationship.' 4
Even the briefest experience with illness shows that ill persons often can
become so anxious, guilty, angry, fearful, or hostile that they make judg-
ments they would not make in calmer times. Patients become preoccupied
with their diseases and their bodies.'" The patient may see his body as an
object that failed him. Patients are forced to reassess their values and goals.
These primary characteristics of illness alter personal wholeness to a
profound degree. They change some of our assumptions about the operation
of personal autonomy in the one who is ill. 6
Healing as a moral component of the physician-patient relationship is not
given sufficient weight in the autonomy model. The physician's task goes
beyond the prevention of harm. It includes restoration or improvement of
biological function. If health is in any degree a value of the body as a biolog-
ical organism, then the physician has some obligation to work toward this
good, which is intrinsic to medicine. This is the case even when the patient,
in the presence of life-threatening illness, may deny or reject health. On this
view both the physician and patient are obliged to work towards restoration
of the good of the body, which is health. We have structured elsewhere the
hierarchical relationship of this good and the good of self-determination
when they are in conflict in, and between, patient and doctor.
17
Distinguished ethicists like James Childress recognize the realities of these
conflicts between autonomy and paternalism. They prefer to err, if they
must, on the side of autonomy of what we consider erroneous meta-ethical
grounds, namely that rights take precedence over goods. The central point
or differences in our own position is that there are better arguments in par-
ticular instances for the ascendancy of goods over rights.
It is, of course, increasingly true that patients with chronic, unremitting,
disabling disorders, like degenerative disorders of the nervous system, incur-
able neoplasms, or intractable pain, may wish to assert their right to an au-
14. Bradley, A Response to the March 1979 Issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philoso-
phy, 5 J. MED. & PHIL. 213-14 (1980). See also E.D. PELLEGRINO & D.C. THOMASMA, A
PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (1981).
15. Cassell, Disease, as an 'It'. Concepts of Disease Revealed by Presentation of Symptoms,
10 SOC. SCI. IN MED. 143 (1976).
16. Pellegrino, Being Ill, Being Healed. Some Reflections on the Grounding of Medical
Morality, 56 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 70 (1981).
17. Pellegrino, Moral Choice, the Good of the Patient, and the Patient's Good, in ETHICS
AND CRITICAL CASE MEDICINE 117 (J. Moskop & L. Kopelman eds. 1985).
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tonomous decision to discontinue treatment or to die. But, most often, life
and health are still primary values most patients will assert over their moral
and legal rights of autonomous refusal of medical care. The average patient
also usually assumes that his health is still the physician's primary value as a
physician. There is a real danger of harm to the patient if doctor and patient
misunderstand each other on this point.
Patient autonomy models often have their origins in the civil and human
rights movement, rather than in an ontology of relations specific to medicine
and healing. Few would disavow the positive gains effected by the political
struggle for human rights. But it does not follow that the adversarial pre-
sumptions of the rights movement are transferable, without modification, to
the debate about the locus of medical decision-making. The image of doc-
tors as adversaries, sinister in their conspiracy against patients, is a colorful
but overplayed metaphor. It stimulates scrutiny of the abuses of power that
can, and all too often do, characterize medical decisions. Nonetheless, there
are still physicians of character motivated by an ethic of compassion and
commitment that transcends post-enlightenment rights-based ethical the-
ores. 18
B. Limitations of Autonomy, Philosophical Critique
Our objections to autonomy as an absolute principle in medical decision-
making, or as a replacement to beneficence, when they are seemingly in con-
flict, needs a little more formal analysis than the foregoing. We find auton-
omy wanting in three dimensions - the contextual, the existential, and the
conceptual.
1. Context Limitation
The autonomy model may not apply in some contexts of medical treat-
ment. For example, paternalism may be appropriate when treating the aged
and senile referred from nursing homes for urinary tract infections.19 In
such cases, physicians may have an obligation to disregard the patient's
wishes until they are convinced that the patient is competent. This is an
example of "weak" paternalism, different in moral quality from "strong"
paternalism in which the objections of a competent patient are overruled, or
deception is practiced to manipulate a decision.
Physicians may, therefore, act over the objections of patients, to preserve
18. Thomasma, The Basis of Medicine and Religion: Respect for Persons, 47 LINACRE Q.
142 (1980).
19. Thomasma, Professional and Ethical Obligations Toward the Aged, 48 LINACRE Q. 73
(1981).
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life or prevent serious harm, when patients are senile, confused, depressed or
otherwise incapacitated in their ability to make autonomous judgments. The
same holds for emergency room treatment. Here the uncertain prognosis,
the urgency for unambiguous decision, and the probability that the patient
would want to be treated were he fully competent, would militate against
unrestrained adherence to the patient's expressed wishes. The same may ap-
ply to hasty requests not to be resuscitated when clinical outcomes are still in
doubt. On the other hand, when the clinical context is clearer, less urgent,
and the patient's competence certain, autonomy can and should be given
primacy.
Weak paternalism may be appropriate when treating children where com-
petence is difficult to judge, or genuinely in doubt. We may presume that,
were they autonomous, children would choose to be treated - provided
there is sufficient benefit to be gained from treatment. This is true too with
therapeutic research in children. The context - the calculus of benefits and
burdens of experimental procedure - will determine the moral licitness of
the research. This would not be the case with non-therapeutic research
where a child would be exposed to risk, without the chance of benefit. One
cannot under any doctrine of paternalism - weak or strong - presume or
impose altruism on the part of another.
The clinical context may change day by day, hour by hour, even in the
same patient and with it, the moral defensibility of any act of paternalism.2°
Senile patients may wax and wane in competence. Acutely and desperately
ill patients with severe trauma and burns may vacillate in their desire to live.
While the decision to treat may be very difficult, the presumption to treat is
often morally defensible if there is appreciable probablility of a successful
outcome. What constitutes "success" under such circumstances may be de-
batable, but overly hasty decisions not to treat out of deference to the princi-
ple of autonomy may be more damaging to the patient's ultimate best
interests than some degree of paternalism.
This "variability of context" is, therefore, an important moral limitation
on autonomy. It demands careful assessment in each case, while remaining
sensitive to the moral obligation to respect patient autonomy. Engelhardt
also takes note of this variability and concludes that it is the product of
rational disagreements about the risk-benefit calculus.2" On this view the
variability rests on the relativity of subjective values of the interpreting par-
ties and not in the objective difference in contexts as we have argued.
20. Thomasma, The Context as a Moral Rule in Medical Ethics, 5 J. BIOETHICS 63 (1984).
21. H.T. Engelhardt, Jr., Health Care Allocations: Responses to the Unjust, the Unfortu-
nate and the Undesirable 27 (Oct. 17, 1980) (draft of seminar paper for Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, Washington, D.C.).
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Irrespective of its origins, context variability raises questions about any
model of patient autonomy. It also underscores the need for some ranking
of goods in medicine if we are to choose one ethical model over others, or
one moral choice over others. Any mode of clinical decision-making, by
virtue of the fact that it is clinical, must take into account the particularities
and uniqueness of each human being's experience of illness.
2. Existential Limitations: The Fact of Illness
The effects of illness and disease on personal autonomy limit self-determi-
nation to variable degrees. That is why so many physicians report that pa-
tients really want them to make the decisions.22 On this view, autonomy
ought not, therefore, be taken as a starting point or absolute ordering princi-
ple in medicine. Rather, it should be seen as part of the goal of treatment,
one of the goods of the patient, to be promoted but not to the total exclusion
of all other goods.
If we take the impact of illness and disease seriously, we must modify the
autonomy model. That model has four features: self-direction, establishing
a life plan, deliberating about applying a life plan (reasoning and informa-
tion), and acting on the basis of such deliberations.23
Becoming "sick" can modify each of these features. To "be" sick is to be
subject to the patho-physiological effects of illness, pain, fear, and to the
special professional and institutional environment in which decisions occur.
Self-direction is marred by the way disease may disrupt the unity of the self,
ego, and the body. Life plans are threatened by the finitude of human life
revealed in illness. Deliberation and application are impeded by the distrac-
tions of pain and fear, or by the process of institutionalization. The extent to
which the operations of autonomy can be impeded by being, and becoming,
a patient is impressive.
Of course the autonomy of most patients is only mildly incapacitated by
disease. We must not, therefore, use the autonomy limitation as an excuse
for all sorts of paternalism. On the whole, patients' choices can, and should,
be accepted. On the other hand, people who are incapacitated by disease or
trauma should not be abandoned to their autonomy, but merely given the
"facts" and asked to make a decision. This is a form of moral abandonment.
The proponents of autonomy as the prime moral obligation should give more
attention to the available data about the psychosocial impact of disease on
personal and moral status. A Medline search in 1985 produced eighty-six
articles directly related to the impact of disease on autonomy and life adjust-
22. Soffer, Searching Questions and Inappropriate Answers, 81 CHEST 533 (1982).
23. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 56-57 (1979).
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ments. These data strongly suggest that: a) autonomy is limited by illness
and disease, and that, b) any model of doctor-patient relationship must take
this limitation into account. Neither of these points is sufficiently appreci-
ated in the current ethical debates about autonomy.
One might argue that we are merely talking about varying degrees of com-
petence, and that the problem is one of determining competence. On this
view the autonomy model would remain intact since incompetent patients
could be treated paternalistically without violating the principles of auton-
omy. Such an interpretation would, however, offend those for whom auton-
omy has become an absolute principle of medical ethics.
3. Conceptual Limitation as a Model
The autonomy model, as a model, is also limited. It has been constructed
in dialectical opposition to the paternalistic model. But neither paternalism
nor autonomy correctly describes the full range of ethical norms governing
the doctor and patient. What occurs between doctor and patient has many
formulations. It can be seen as restoring autonomy, safeguarding the per-
son, 24 respecting persons, 2" healing or restoring a lost wholeness, 2 6 putting
the patient's needs first,2 7 making a right and good medical decision,28 or
acting in the best interests of the patient.2 9 Each formulation ascribes a
somewhat different moral tone to the physician's obligations with respect to
the patient's autonomy.
What occurs between doctor and patient in non-therapeutic research is
not encompassed in any of these terms. The goal here is not primarily the
benefit of the experimental subject but the discovery of knowledge. More-
over, the subject's autonomy is not affected by illness. In non-therapeutic
research then, respect for autonomy is mandatory as a moral principle. The
duty of beneficence towards the patient would be at the lowest level of sensi-
tivity - i.e., non-maleficence. In therapeutic research, however, the good of
the patient is involved, and the questions about autonomy and paternalism
would be the same as the ones we have already raised.
24. Pellegrino, Philosophical Grounding for Treating the Patient as Person - A Commen-
tary on Alasdair Maclntyre, in CHANGING VALUES IN MEDICINE (E.J. Cassell & M. Siegler
eds. 1979).
25. Thomasma, supra note 18.
26. Address by Edward Pellegrino, University of Illinois Medical Center Commencement
Ceremony (June 6, 1980).
27. McGovern, The Patient Comes First, 3 F. MED. 596-98 (1980).
28. Pellegrino, The Healing Relationship: Architectonics of Clinical Medicine, in IV THE
CLINICAL ENCOUNTER, THE MORAL FABRIC OF THE PATIENT PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP,
PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE (The Phil. & Med. Book Series E. Shelp ed. 1983).
29. Ingelfinger, Arrogance, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1507 (1980).
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C. Social-Ethical Limitations of Autonomy
Beyond its limitations in one-to-one medical decisions, autonomy as a
dominant ethical principle in medical ethics has serious limitations in social
ethics, as well. These are: 1) the movement it fosters from substantive to
procedural ethics; 2) the move from concern for the common to individual
good; and 3) the erosion of the concept of democracy itself. Only brief men-
tion into these limitations is possible here.
1. From Substance to Procedure in Ethics
One very strong impetus for the trend toward autonomy is the obvious
moral pluralism of our society and the possibility that physicians and others
in authority may override personal belief systems. One way to guard against
this kind of moral trespass is to accept the irreconcilability of moral conflict,
and turn the focus on the process of decision-making. Emphasis is then
placed on respect for the autonomy of the parties to a clinical decision. Most
of the recommendations of the multi-volume reports of the President's Com-
mission for the Study of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 30 place their
emphasis on procedure - informed consent, anticipatory declarations of
several kinds, the proper use of proxy and surrogate decision makers and the
establishment of ethics committees. Many of the cases that have come to the
courts have turned on the question of who shall decide, under what condi-
tions, and by what criteria. Formalization of the decision-making process is
reflected also in the recommendations of the Department of Health and
Human Services 31 pertaining to the care of terminally ill, handicapped and
physically impaired infants. Tristram Engelhardt has argued particularly
vigorously that the function of ethics itself in a morally pluralistic society
that wishes to remain peaceable must be analysis and clarification. A partic-
ular set of values he contends cannot be propounded for the whole commu-
nity; freedom is to be protected at all costs. Ethics therefore must not
concern itself with moral content or normative prescriptions.
3 2
This neat dissection of analytical from normative ethics is illusory. Ana-
lytical ethics does in fact make a normative assertion, namely that autonomy
is the first principle, and it overrides all others. Engelhardt's rigorous extra-
polation of the logic of autonomy to its conclusions is the strongest argu-
ment against a purely procedural ethic. Pragmatically attractive as it may
30. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (multi-volume series 1983).
31. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program: The Final Rule, 50
Fed. Reg. 14,878-14,901 (1985) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101).
32. H.T. ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS (1986).
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be in such a morally pluralistic and democratic society as ours, procedure
cannot be self-justifying. To assert freedom as ultimate means that the
search for the good life, and a good life, and the good society must be aban-
doned. We are forced to retreat into private morality for the most meaning-
ful questions humans ask. But this retreat brings its own serious problems
with it.
2. Moral Atomism
The retreat to private morality eventually leads to a kind of moral atom-
ism in which each individual's moral beliefs and actions - unless they dis-
turb the peaceable community - are unassailable. Moral debate is not only
frustrating but futile, since each person is his own arbiter of the right and the
good. The traditional notion of ethics as reasoned public discourse in search
of the common good is discarded. The sense of community identity that
derives from some consensus on things that ought to be done, and what
ought never to be done is lost.
The overall result is a defection from what John Courtney Murray called
the "affairs of the commonwealth."33 These affairs end up in courts, decided
by legal adversarial procedure and judicial opinion which must inevitably
mix moral issues without the accompanying moral debate requisite to ethi-
cally sound judgment.
For example, is the decision to withhold elective treatment from a
Down's Syndrome child the private decision of its parents based on their
evaluation of quality of life, or their personal and social burden of raising a
retarded child? Moral privatism of this sort challenges government intru-
sion, and dilutes the state's "interests." Can the obligation of government to
protect the rights of the weak, the vulnerable, and the comatose, be abro-
gated on the plea of moral privacy and autonomy? The Baby Doe case in
Bloomington, Indiana and the Baby Jane Doe case in Stony Brook, Long
Island are cases in point.34
It is impossible to escape the burden of doing ethics since most people still
want to know whether what is procedurally acceptable is also right and
good. Freedom to make one's own choices must be protected, but the flight
into metaethics will not eradicate the equal need for society to engage in the
pursuit of some common moral goals beyond autonomy.
33. J. COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960).
34. Angell, The Baby Doe Rules, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 642-44 (1986). See also Child
Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, supra note 31.
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3. Erosion of the Idea of Democracy
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the absolutization of autonomy
is the limit it places on the idea of democracy itself. Democracy is reduced
to a procedure for settling otherwise irreconcilable differences among citi-
zens, but without commitment to any common set of values except freedom
of private judgment. Certainly one measure of a democratic society is the
degree of freedom it affords for divergent and contrary opinion. But those
freedoms must serve some common community purpose as well.
Is not one of the traditional aims of our democracy to advance the cause
of community rather than its atomization? This is our inheritance from the
classical and Judaen-Christian traditions. How far may this inheritance be
squandered without corroding the idea of democracy itself? How logical is
the separation between public and private morals? Is the purpose of govern-
ment only to restrain unbridled self-interest or to promote the common
good? The incommensurability of some of today's conflicting moral claims
makes consensus unlikely. But without moral consensus private values be-
come more selfish, more crude, and more intensely combative. Power be-
comes the make of morals if the common moral perspective is lost and
democracy itself is weakened. Is there some other choice than Rousseau or
Khomeni?
The socio-political and socio-ethical consequences of the move toward au-
tonomy are yet to be comprehended fully. Medical ethics - as the arena of
some of the sharpest ethical debates in contemporary society - is the para-
digm that brings these questions to our immediate attention. Their signifi-
cance transcends medical ethics. And how we resolve them will determine
what kind of society we shall have.
III LIMITATIONS OF THE PATERNALISM MODEL
Just as formidable objections to the patient autonomy model can be raised,
so too can objections be raised to medical paternalism. The foremost objec-
tion is that a physician often cannot heal a person just by curing a disease,
especially if the physician systematically ignores or disregards the patient's
view. Cassell's argument that restoring function, or curing, should be a sec-
ondary aim of medicine, and that medicine's primary aim is to restore auton-
omy, has much to recommend it.35 It is a little extreme, however, and in its
way absolutizes autonomy as Childress has pointed out.3 6
Healing does involve restoring autonomy. For this reason, Culver and
35. J.C. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE: PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
36. Id.
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Gert are correct to insist that strong paternalism always demands justifica-
tion because it violates a moral rule. But Culver and Gert do not deal di-
rectly with the moral content of medicine itself. Strong paternalism is
objectionable not only because it violates moral rules, but because it violates
the architectonic aim of medicine, which is to heal the one who is ill. To
violate a person's autonomy is not to heal, but to wound his humanity.
Strong paternalism is objectionable because it violates the humanity of the
patient. The obligation is owed rational beings to be free to decide about the
conduct of their own lives. Indeed, such decisions are peculiarly human. To
infringe on such a fundamental right clearly demands special justification.
Medical paternalism fails because it overrides an essential element in deonto-
logical ethics, at the core of medicine, i.e., respect for persons. To violate the
patient's autonomy is to deprive him of one essential component of his own
good, and thus to violate medicine's promise to act for the good of the
patient.
Many physicians hold that the patient's rights to autonomy should not get
in the way of their medical needs, i.e., medical "indications" should domi-
nate clinical decisions. But as we shall argue the case, the hierarchy of pa-
tient goods may not always place medical needs in the highest place.37 Lack
of respect for such a hierarchy of values is a major cause of patient com-
plaints about physician paternalism.
Like the autonomy model, medical paternalism can fail to distinguish con-
texts and their role in medical and ethical decision-making. As a conse-
quence, medical paternalism tends to universalize a stance valid in one
context but not necessarily in another. Generalization of one experience,
like "saving" one patient through paternalism, into a universal moral pos-
ture, is not valid.
Perhaps the biggest failure of medical paternalism is its assumption that
medical values or medical good is the highest good, and that it has an abso-
lute quality which overrides other values. Or, even less justifiably, a particu-
lar physician's preferences for one treatment among several may become an
absolute. Some surgeons prefer radical mastectomy while others prefer lim-
ited resection and radiation for cancer of the breast. Some cardiologists pre-
fer medical over surgical management in certain types of angina pectoris.
Alternative procedures may lead to similar outcomes but with different risks
and quality of life. Selection of one procedure over others depends as much
on the patient's and the physician's values as on the scientific data. The
patient, for reasons of great importance to him, may reject even the scientifi-
cally preferred therapy for one of lesser effectiveness.
37. See Pellegrino, supra note 17.
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Medical paternalism asserts that the physician unequivocally knows better
than the patient what is "good" for him. It also subsumes all the patient's
good under only one good - medical good - a point we shall develop in
more detail later. Other dimensions of the good of the patient must also be
considered. One of these is surely the preservation of the fundamental
human good of making one's own decisions about the kind of life one wants
to lead, or the risks one wants to take.
In what ways, then, is the paternalism model inadequate? We suggest
three criticisms, parallel to the three we levelled at the autonomy model.
A. Context Limitation
Paternalism may apply in a certain limited context, such as making deci-
sions over the objection of a mnor about what might be best for that child,
but it cannot function as a universal or general principle of medicine since it
assumes something fundamentally flawed: not only that professionals know
what is best for all patients, but also that they may override the patient's
wishes in the pursuit of what is medically indicated. Paternalism has en-
joyed such a long season because physicians can readily offer examples in
which their expertise saved some patient from a truly disastrous decision.
An internist of our acquaintance, for example, cites a "memorable" time
when he convinced a rabbi to have a colostomy following colonic resection
for cancer. The convincing took three days of vigorous debate and discus-
sion. In telling this tale, the physician appealed to the metaphysical assump-
tion that it is better to live than to die, to live with an impairment than to die
without one. In the main, persons do accept this assumption, but not al-
ways, and not everywhere. To what extent he may, or may not, have unjus-
tifiably exhausted the rabbi's will to autonomy is impossible to say. Given
the rabbi's Talmudic training, the dialectic must have been intense and the
physician's "victory" not an easy one.
B. Existential Limitation
Not only is the context a limiting factor, but the concept of paternalism
itself is limited. It is not just a matter of the fallacy of expertise. The expert
does not always know more about what is "best" for the non-expert. Diffi-
culties of prognosis and the harms/benefit calculus are obvious limitations.
There is also no way to define clearly what is absolutely best for the patient
in medical terms alone. That definition is always related to the values the
patient professes, those the institution and society assume, and those the cul-
ture holds to be important. Lacking any unequivocal definition of "benefit,"
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the physician cannot presume to define the whole of the patient's good with-
out essential input from the patient.
Some patients reject the benefits of medical interventions simply for their
own reasons. Mr. Bartling, in a hospital intensive care unit in California,
wished to be removed from the respirator even though he understood this
would lead to his death. The Supreme Court of California upheld his legal
right to his request. Some hospitals or other institutions may limit the medi-
cal benefits to be given patients. For example, Catholic hospitals rule out
abortions. Nursing homes may have policies which "interpret" benefit to
patients to include limitations on cardio-pulmonary resuscitation.
Society defines what benefits shall be given its citizens in general, and even
which medical benefits may be offered. In England, there are limitations on
the use of dialysis after a certain age. Respirators are removed after ten days
if certain patients do not respond by that time. Finally, social values are in a
constant state of definition and re-definition. At the moment our social val-
ues tend to accept the medical intervention model of beneficence. Other cul-
tures, or subcultures within our own, may accept or reject this model.
All of these considerations put limits on paternalism. They mitigate the
absoluteness of benefit from medical benefits that paternalism requires.
C. Conceptual Limitation as a Model
Paternalism as a model of patient-physician relationship is itself flawed.
At the root of this limitation is the fact that authentic healing cannot take
place in a paternalistic model, since paternalism overrides patient choices.
Personal choice is essential to the processes of reintegration essential to heal-
ing. Undeniably, "cures" can often take place in a paternalistic relationship
- for example, treating pneumococcal pneumonia in an elderly patient with
a stroke. This is "effective," and medically indicated, but not necessarily
beneficial treatment, if the patient is dying of metastatic malignancy.
The paternalistic model also fosters a certain detachment deleterious to
patient "care" and it separates cures from care. The physician tends to ap-
ply the medically indicated course of action as if that patient were, indeed,
the corpus upon which one practiced the medical craft. A "cure" might
ensue. But the patient's most cherished value, his life plan, the kind of life
he might wish to have, his relationships to others might be so violated as to
vitiate the medical good. Wounding outweighs healing under such cir-
cumstances.
IV BENEFICENCE IN TRUST: A MODEL FOR MEDICAL DECISIONS
If both autonomy and paternalism have deficiencies, what model of medi-
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cal decisions and clinical ethics would avoid the litigations of each - and
also optimize their utility in advancing the good of the patient? We believe
that a reinterpretation of the principle of beneficence can achieve these ends
and the remainder of this essay details the way we think it can do so in a
model which centers on beneficence in trust.
A. The Principle of Beneficence: Degrees of Sensitivity to Good of Others
Since the model we wish to propound is grounded in the principle of be-
neficence, we must first outline our understanding of this essential first prin-
ciple of medicine and healing. Beneficence, like the good of the patient
which it presumably serves, is not a univocal or simple notion. There are
levels of beneficence, as Frankena points out.38 Just how and at what level
one interprets beneficence will determine the moral obligations one feels one
owes patients, and also the degree of altruism one feels obliged to practice.
The most minimal level is the level of non-maleficence, i.e., the duty not to
do direct harm to another. This is the level contained in the Hippocratic
prescription in the Epidemics - "at least do no harm." This level of benefi-
cence is expected in any civilized society. It is enjoined even in the most
extreme libertarian moral philosophies.
A further step in beneficence is the duty to prevent harm to others, i.e., to
remove or limit the possibilities of harm. Here we move from passive non-
maleficence to a more active intervention on behalf of others. At once, even
at this minimal level, the possibility of paternalism begins to appear. For
example, we might readily agree that there is a duty to remove an obstacle
on a railroad track that would result in derailment and harm to other people.
But this action might conceivably deprive some passenger who at that mo-
ment wishes to die and would prefer to do so in a railway accident, of the
privilege of doing so. Most people would discount such an unlikely prospect
and agree that there was a positive moral obligation to remove the object in
the interest of the majority of passengers who certainly do not want to die
this way.
But what about protecting people against accidents by enforcing laws to
"buckle up," or wear helmets, or wear goggles at work. This view of benefi-
cence requires a more direct limitation of autonomy. While libertarians
might resist this degree of paternalism, society seems to be giving certain
measures like these sanction on the thesis of harm to others by the economic
costs and disability incurred by society which suffer the injured to go un-
treated - even if they elect to ignore safety requirements.
One, however, can go further - and out of the principle of preventing
38. W.K. FRANKENA, ETHICS (1963).
1987]
40 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 3:23
harm, make the growing of tobacco, or the preparation of distilled liquors
illegal. Here the intervention, while indirect so far as the one injured goes, is
nonetheless significant for smokers and tobacco growers. Freedom and au-
tonomy conflict in this case with beneficence in a way our society does not at
this point countenance. Conceivably it might sanction such measures at
some time in the future. To do so is to raise the interpretation of beneficence
to a higher degree than simple non-maleficence.
Even further along the scale is to interpret the duty of beneficence as bind-
ing even at some risk of discomfort or pain to the benefactor. Law does not
require anyone to risk life, limb or even inconvenience to save the life of
another. But in medical encounters, traditionally some degree of effacement
of personal self-interest has always been understood as a duty. One needs
only to think of the expectation that physicians will treat patients with con-
tagious diseases (AIDS is a current case in point) and the scorn heaped on
physicians who desert their posts in time of disaster, or epidemic. Camus'
Rieux is an exemplary physician precisely because he did not desert the peo-
ple of Oran even though he might have claimed the privilege since his wife
was ill elsewhere in a sanatorium.
This level of beneficence is implicit in that "higher degree of self-efface-
ment" - which Harvey Cushing termed the "common devotion" of the
medical profession. It is admittedly a degree of beneficence above that ex-
pected by law, or the mores of other activities like business, relationships
with neighbors, or professional colleagues. It is a level, we would submit,
that is essential to medicine as a moral enterprise. Without some degree of
self-effacement, medicine ceases to be a profession, in any traditional sense of
that term, and becomes only a trade or craft.
On the other hand, the degree of self-effacement expected is not of the
heroic or sacrificial kind. It does not require the dedication of a Mother
Teresa, Albert Schweitzer, or St. Francis. In them, we move beyond duty -
at least in secular terms - to supererogation, to obligations one may feel out
of religious or other altruistic motives. We enter here the realm of "agapeis-
tic" ethics - one grounded in love and charity for others.39
We would argue that beneficence in medical transactions should include
some degree of effacement of the physician's self-interest in the interests of
his patient. Just how much effacement is required cannot be defined in any
absolute way. Many physicians today think this degree of beneficence is
questionable and even objectionable. Physicians are asserting their "rights"
to recreation, family life, social activity, time off, freedom to choose to treat
only those who pay, the right to strike, and to work for investor-owned insti-
39. G. OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1972).
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tutions. These may not be overtly unethical practices, but they are often at
the moral margin where self-effacement would dictate some limit on the phy-
sician's personal interests or privileges.
For the purposes of the model we wish to advance we will argue that the
fact of illness, what it does to the sick person, and the kind of special rela-
tionship it entails with the physician dictate a degree of beneficence that goes
beyond passive non-maleficence. It includes, in our view, some obligation to
act in the patient's interests even at some cost to the comfort, power, prestige
or fiscal benefit of the physician.
With this interpretation of beneficence let us turn to the model which we
feel most closely exemplifies the duties physicians owe patients.
B. Major Features of the Beneficence Model
Given the shortcomings we have pointed out with both the patient auton-
omy and medical paternalism models, is there an alternative that does not
reduce to one or the other? We suggest there is, though we appreciate that
the complexity of the physician-patient relationship can never be adequately
described in a single model. One purpose in sketching the beneficence model
is to circumvent the substantial problems with the models we have already
mentioned. We do not claim that the physician-patient relationship is fully
defined by this model either.
There are six major features of the beneficence model:
1) The Aim of Medicine is Beneficent
Medicine as a human activity is of necessity a form of beneficence. It is a
response to the need and plea of a sick person for help, without which the
patient might die, or suffer unnecessary pain, or disability. The obligation to
help the sick is a general one involving humans, even those who are not
professed healers. It is grounded in the claim that comes from the vulnera-
bility and suffering of a fellow human. One is impelled, even by the lesser
degrees of beneficence, not to harm, and even, to ease suffering.
When one is a professed healer one possesses knowledge and skill society
has permitted one to acquire precisely because it can benefit others. One
also promises to help and to act on behalf of the good of the patient when
one offers oneself to another as a healer. Further, without the special knowl-
edge the healer has acquired others would suffer so that, in a sense, all the
sick have some claim on all healers.'
Beneficence is a prime requirement for medicine and it has three specific
40. Thomasma & Pellegrino, Philosophy of Medicine as the Source for Medical Ethics, 2
METAMED. 5 (1981).
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obligations. First, the patient's problems and needs are the physician's pri-
mary concern, taking precedence, except in the rarest circumstances, over all
other concerns. Second, harm must be avoided because the physician cannot
fulfill the promise of helping if he intentionally harms the patient for any
reason. Third, both autonomy and paternalism are superseded by the obli-
gation to act beneficently, that is to say, the choice of whether one acts to
foster autonomy, or acts paternalistically should be based on that which
most benefits the patient and not the intellectual convictions or emotional
impulses of the physician.
2) Primacy of the Existential Condition of the Patient
The second feature of the beneficence model is the primacy of the existen-
tial condition of the patient rather than of traditional professional codes. A
good example can be found in Mark Siegler's list of criteria for deciding the
limits of autonomy to be accepted by a physician treating a seriously ill pa-
tient.4 ' These criteria include the patient's ability to make rational choices
about care, the nature and past values of the patient, the age of the patient,
the nature of the illness, the values of the physician who must make a choice
in the care of the patient, and the clinical setting, especially the diffusion of
care. The first four items deal with the personal condition of the patient, and
the last two deal with the health care professional and the environment. Pre-
sumably, Siegler does not mean that age should be considered an independ-
ent variable in making decisions, but rather as his subsequent writings would
suggest, age is a valuable marker of the condition of the patient.
3) No Automatic Ranking of Values
Both the patient's autonomy and medical paternalism models emphasize
single values which are always to be preferred. For example, the patient's
right to autonomy is always to be preferred over other values in the patient's
autonomy model. In the paternalism model, each patient must be treated as
if he or she did not know what is best. By contrast, in the beneficent model,
no such "automatic" ranking of values takes place. The elements of the
beneficence model are not ranked in any pre-set hierarchy. Each patient
must be handled individually not only for the medical but also for the moral
implications. No ethical stance, other than acting for the patient's best inter-
ests, is applied beforehand. This model requires that patients and physicians
become able to identify, rank, discuss, and negotiate values,42 and to define
41. Siegler, Critical Illness: The Limits of Autonomy, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (Oct.
1977).
42. Thomasma, Training in Medical Ethics: An Ethical Workup, 1 F. MED. 33 (1978).
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the particular good of a particular patient. This is not to say, however, that
general ethical axioms applied to more than one patient are invalid.
4) Consensus
The fourth feature of the model is consensus. Because there is to be no
imposition of values, or decisions made in the best interests of patients with-
out their participation, a consensus with the patient and with other members
of the health care team is needed. Admittedly, a consensus model takes time
and energy but it also wards off many agonizing hours of later conflict in the
course of a serious illness. In fact, one of the seductions of the autonomy
and paternalism models is the comparative ease of their decision-making
mechanisms - either the physician makes all the decisions, or the patient
does so. Both models abandon the trials and rewards of a mutual dialogue
and exchange between doctor and patient.43 Both also can assault the moral
agency of the patient or the physician.
A consensus reached at the beginning of a patient's care cannot be as-
sumed to continue unchanged as new developments occur. The consensus
must be monitored for its continued validity. This requires a continuing
dialogue between the patient and his medical attendants.
5) Prudential Moral Object
The fifth feature is a prudential moral object; i.e., an attempt must be
made to resolve difficult ethical quandries by preserving as many values of
both the patient and physician as possible. Ackerman has argued that this
should be the goal of bioethics." Whether or not one agrees entirely, it is a
goal of a consensus-driven, patient-oriented approach in which prudential
judgments are made on a patient-by-patient basis.
6) Axioms
Explicit axioms comprise the sixth and last major feature of the benefi-
cence model. Just as the physician examines each patient in light of genera-
lized theories or categories of disease and health, his prudential judgment
about each patient must adhere to a series of more general ethical axioms, or
moral rules. These are necessary to avoid the moral pitfalls of the autonomy
and paternalism models, and of situational studies.
Axioms of the Beneficence Model
1) Both doctor and patient must be free to make informed decisions and to
43. J. KATZ, supra note 3.
44. Ackerman, What Bioethics Should Be, 5 J. MED. & PHIL. 260 (1980).
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act fully as moral agents. The values of both doctor and patient must be
respected since each is a person deserving of respect as such. Value consen-
sus results only if each can, without coercion or deception, express his own
values in discourse and action. Neither can impose his values on the other;
neither can "use" the other for selfish ends; each must be free to withdraw
from the relationship if value conflicts are not resolvable.45
2) Physicians have the greater responsibility in the relationship because of
the inherent inequality of information and power between themselves and
those who are ill. Physicians are obliged therefore to provide the information
patients need to make genuinely informed decisions, and to use their power
with due regard for the vulnerability and exploitability of the sick. These
obligations are rooted in the special nature of the healing relationship. The
self-imposed moral aims of the profession and the expectations of society
derive their force from this fact as well.
3) Physicians must be persons of personal moral integrity. The physician
must have the capacity to make prudential judgments that factor in the par-
ticulars of each case, the general features of the disease and general moral
principles. Ultimately, the good of the patient depends as much on the phy-
sician's character as his capacity to make these judgments. Furthermore, it
depends on the extent to which he can be trusted to keep the good of the
patient as his primary aim.46 In a morally pluralistic society, there is a ten-
dency to downplay moral character in the education of the physician. How-
ever, there are qualities of moral judgment that should apply to all
physicians and for this they will need to be educated. As Aristotle noted, "it
is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment." 47
Yet, skills without moral integrity will not suffice in those moments when no
one is there to watch, thus the good of the patient hangs on the moral integ-
rity of the physician.48
4) Physicians must respect and comprehend moral ambiguity yet not aban-
don the search for what is right and good in each decision. By training and
disposition, physicians are inclined to diagnostic closure and problem resolu-
tion. They are dismayed when there is no single "right" answer to a moral
dilemma. Yet in the beneficence model this may often be the case since the
45. Pellegrino, The Anatomy of Clinical Judgments, Some Notes on Right Reason and
Right Actions, in 6 CLINICAL JUDGMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Phil. & Med. Book Series
H.T. Engelhardt, Jr., S.F. Spicker & B. Towers eds. 1979).
46. Pellegrino, The Virtuous Physician and the Ethics of Medicine, in 7 VIRTUE AND
MEDICINE: EXPLANATIONS IN THE CHARACTER OF MEDICINE (Phil. & Med. Book Series E.
Shelp ed. 1985).
47. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS BOOK 43 (T. Page ed. 1934).
48. Thomasma, Report Number 2, in CAPSTONE CONFERENCE WORKSHOPS: REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE STATE OF THE ART 66-79 (1982).
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good is defined by principles and individuals in their life contexts without
standardized formulae. Physicians must avoid the pitfalls so aptly described
by Alasdair Maclntyre: "It is a central feature of contemporary moral de-
bates that they are unsettleable and interminable .... [B]ecause no argu-
ment can be carried through to victorious conclusion, argument
characteristically gives way to the mere and increasingly shrill battle of as-
sertion with counter assertion."4 9 No matter how frustrating moral "de-
bates" may be, the physician must still make moral decisions with, and for,
his patients. It is incumbent upon him, therefore, to learn how to deal with
the reality of moral ambiguity. He has not the scholar's luxury of "on the
one hand" and "on the other hand," etc. He just acts, and to act is to choose
among alternatives - moral as well as technical.
CONCLUSION
The values of patient welfare and patient autonomy - which translate
into the corresponding moral duties of beneficence and respect for persons
- may come into tension with each other. In our view, however, these du-
ties cannot remain in conflict if medicine is to achieve its goal of healing.
But healing, as we define it, is a form of assistance in making the patient
whole again by working through his body. If the values of patient welfare
and patient autonomy remain in conflict, then authentic healing cannot take
place. A physician, therefore, must become a moderate autonomist, and a
moderate welfarist, at once. This can be accomplished in a beneficence
model like the one we suggest.
Another way of arriving at this position is to consider the principle of
respect for persons. This principle leads to two moral duties. The first is to
respect the self-determination or autonomy of others. The second, often-
neglected duty, is to help restore that autonomy or help establish it when it
is absent. Looked at in this way, beneficence is seen to be a direct conse-
quence of a fundamental moral principle and the guiding duty of medicine.
If this is true, then the autonomy model is necessarily incomplete.
Beneficence is the principle that prompts physicians to cite their moral
commitments and personal support for patients beyond just respecting their
rights. It is beneficence, not authoritarianism, as he incorrectly supposed,
that prompted Ingelfinger to argue that doctors must recommend a course of
action, not just lay out alternatives and abandon patients."0 It is also benefi-
cence, not just respect for autonomy, that properly protects patients' rights.
49. Maclntyre, Why is the Search for the Foundations of Ethics so Frustrating?, 9 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 16 (Aug. 1979).
50. Ingelfinger, supra note 29.
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It is the primary duty of beneficence, and not paternalism, that has histori-
cally been the guiding norm of medicine.
To be sure, beneficence can be and has been subverted into paternalism.
But if our task is "proposing revised values" as Callahan asserts,5 then it is
important to focus on the virtue of benevolence (or the principle of benefi-
cence) rather than on the rule of autonomy. This virtue is consistent with
the ethical tradition of persons united in community. This is a tradition
keeping more with the ethical roots of medicine than one that stresses auton-
omous individualism.
51. Callahan, Shattuck Lecture - Contemporary Biomedical Ethics. 302 Ni-w ENG. J.
MED. 1228 (1980).
